Abstract. We propose a new account of calibration according to which calibrating a technique shows that the technique does what it is supposed to do. To motivate our account, we examine an early 20 th century debate about chlorophyll chemistry and Mikhail Tswett's use of chromatographic adsorption analysis to study it. We argue that Tswett's experiments established that his technique was reliable in the special case of chlorophyll without relying on either a theory or a standard calibration experiment. We suggest that Tswett broke the Experimenters' Regress by appealing to material facts in the common ground for chemists at the time.
Calibrating Chromatography: How Tswett Broke the Experimenters' Regress
In this paper, we propose a new account of calibration according to which calibrating a technique (or instrument) is to show that the technique (or instrument) does what it is supposed to do. In other words, calibration establishes that a technique (or instrument) works as intended. To motivate our account of calibration, we examine an early 20 th century debate between Mikhail Tswett (1872 -1919 and Leon Marchlewski (1869 -1946 about chlorophyll chemistry and the appropriate methods for investigating it. Tswett was a botanist whose interest in chlorophyll led him to develop chromatographic adsorption analysis (hereafter, CAA), a separation technique in physical chemistry. 1 Marchlewski was a prominent chlorophyll chemist who was highly critical of Tswett and his chromatographic method. In this paper, we focus on experiments that Tswett conducted to address Marchlewski's concern that the process of CAA altered the chemical character of chlorophyll. We argue that Tswett's experiments established that CAA was reliable in the special case of chlorophyll without relying on either a theory of CAA or a standard calibration experiment, which would have involved applying CAA to a mixture of known character (a surrogate signal) and verifying that CAA yielded the correct analysis. We then offer a guess as to Tswett's reasoning. We suggest that Tswett relied on material facts in the common ground for chemists at the time. By appealing to local material facts accepted by chemists at the time, Tswett answered his critic's complaint that his appeals to CAA were viciously circular and broke the Experimenters' Regress. We further suggest that Tswett did not conduct a standard calibration experiment because the material assumptions required to secure the reliability of CAA by way of a standard calibration experiment would have seemed dubious to chemists at the time. Tswett developed CAA in 1902 . In subsequent years, he published several papers in which he used CAA to study the chemistry of chlorophyll, but the wider scientific community did not accept his technique as reliable until the 1930s. Livengood (2009) reviews a dozen explanations suggested in earlier literature for the initial rejection of Tswett's chromatography. He argues that chromatography was premature in the sense that it could not be properly connected with either entrenched chemical and botanical theories or entrenched laboratory practices. 2 In defending his generalized prematurity explanation of the rejection of chromatography, Livengood considers an alternative explanation that he attributes to Clark Glymour and Balázs Gyenis. According to Livengood (2009, 66-67) , Glymour and Gyenis suggested in conversation that chromatography was initially rejected because Tswett did not carry out a calibration experiment showing that CAA produced similar results to entrenched techniques on samples of known character. Hereafter, we will use the label s-calibration to denote an experiment of the sort suggested by Glymour and Gyenis: one in which a new technique (or instrument) is applied to a standard or surrogate signal so that the deliverances of the technique may be checked. Granting that Tswett did not carry out an s-calibration experiment, Livengood argues that Tswett did calibrate his technique in a way that better fit his problem.
The present paper expands on Livengood's story by connecting Tswett's development of chromatography with the Experimenters' Regress and the Material Theory of Induction. 3 In Section 1, we discuss the problem of determining the number and properties of the parts of "raw chlorophyll" that occupied Tswett's attention in the last fifteen years of his life, and we describe the technique that Tswett developed in order to solve the problem as well as the experiments he performed in defense of his technique. 4 In Section 2 we discuss the Experimenters' Regress and its relationship to challenges Tswett faced from two of his contemporaries: Willstätter and Marchlewski, and we argue that Tswett could not have broken the Regress by appealing to any "theory of the instrument" then available to him. In Section 3 we provide a detailed explanation of why Tswett did not carry out an s-calibration experiment. We argue that s-calibration would not have answered the only relevant objection to his technique as applied to chlorophyll. In the historical circumstances, it would have been unreasonable to assume that the character of chlorophyll was suitably similar to the character of any surrogate sample. Hence, s-calibration would not have addressed the worry that adsorption analysis somehow altered the character of the chlorophyll and so would not have broken the Experimenters' Regress. We then show how Tswett in fact broke the Regress by way of experiments he did perform. In Section 4 we argue that Tswett's case gives us reason to want a broader account of calibration. On a narrow account according to which calibration just is s-calibration, it seems that either calibration could not have served its epistemic function in Tswett's case or CAA simply could not have been calibrated with respect to chlorophyll. Accepting that we ought to give a broader account, we suggest looking to the epistemic function of calibration for theoretical guidance. We then propose an account of calibration according to which a calibration experiment is any experiment designed to show that an instrument does what it is supposed to do.
Section 1: The Explanatory Problem: Tswett and Chromatography
For most of his professional life, Tswett was concerned with the chemistry of chlorophyll and its role in photosynthesis. The problems of chlorophyll chemistry were wellestablished. In 1864, George Stokes sent a very brief communication to the Royal Society, which included some "remarks on the Constitution of Chlorophyll." In his note, Stokes says that he has been working for some time on the optical and chemical properties of chlorophyll. He writes, "I find the chlorophyll of land-plants to be a mixture of four substances, two green and two yellow, all possessing highly distinctive optical properties." As the nineteenth century ended, botanists and botanically-minded chemists knew that raw chlorophyll was a mixture of several distinct chemical compounds.
However, no one knew the exact number of compounds, the proportions in which they occurred, their individual chemical structures and properties, and whether the answers to these questions were different for different kinds of plant. 5 Tswett (1906d, 388) emphasized the application of CAA to the problem of determining the number of the parts of raw chlorophyll Tswett had argued in his doctoral dissertation that chlorophyll was bound to plant leaves by adsorption. In 1902, he experimented with some 150 different adsorbent materials in an effort to formulate a general law of adsorption, which would further his understanding of the binding process in plants. 7 He never discovered any law of adsorption, but his research led him to discover a simple and powerful physical separation technique that he immediately applied to the problems of chlorophyll chemistry, confirming "in a new, original way the view of Stokes" (Willstätter, 1915, 5 See Peirce (1903, 51-58) for a prospective look at the problems of chlorophyll chemistry. See Stewart (1918, (189) (190) (191) (192) (193) (194) (195) (196) (197) (198) (199) (200) (201) (202) (203) (204) (205) (206) (207) (208) and Willstätter (1915) for retrospectives. 6 Throughout this paper, we provide English translations of the original German texts for the convenience of the reader, but owing to space constraints, we cannot include the original texts. 7 We don't know exactly what Tswett's experiments involved, since the details were never published and no laboratory record survives.
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) and making a large number of observations about the optical properties of the parts of raw chlorophyll.
In 1903, Tswett published his first description of his new technique of CAA. 8 The method was elegant. One simply filled a slender glass tube with finely ground chalk or sugar, dissolved the substance being analyzed in a suitable solvent (for chlorophyll, this was calcium disulphide or petroleum ether), and poured the results into the tube. The different parts of the substance would be adsorbed at different rates by the same adsorbent, and so, the parts would separate out in bands along the adsorbing column.
Since chlorophyll is a pigment, the separated parts would appear as distinct bands of color. Following separation, Tswett would push the chalk or sugar column out of the tube and cut the bands apart with a scalpel. He would then redissolve each part (itself a compound) in its own solvent and perform a spectral analysis.
To our minds, Tswett faced two substantive concerns about his application of CAA to chlorophyll and one methodological objection to his technique independent of its specific application. We will discuss in subsequent sections the methodological objection that Tswett's results were only supported by viciously circular appeal to his own method.
In the rest of this section, we discuss the substantive concerns: namely, (1) that the sample might be chemically altered by interaction with the adsorbing material in the column and (2) that the sample might be oxidized during adsorption. As we will see in Section 2, Tswett's response to the substantive concerns underpins a response to the methodological objection as well. The first substantive concern was explicitly 8 An English translation of Tswett's 1903 paper was published with commentary in Hesse and Weil (1954) .
acknowledged by Tswett, and he conducted experiments to directly address it. 9 The second was raised by Willstätter and as far as we know Tswett was unaware of it. 10 The two concerns are instances of a more general worry that the sample might be altered in some systematic way during adsorption. Tswett worried that the sample might be altered by chemical interaction with the adsorbent material. Willstätter worried that it might be altered in virtue of being adsorbed but not necessarily through chemical interaction with the adsorbent material.
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As we argue in the rest of this section, Tswett's experiments sufficed to address both his own concern that there might be chemical interaction between the sample and the adsorbing column and also Willstätter's concern that the sample might be oxidized while in a more vulnerable adsorbed state. In fact, Tswett's experiments sufficed to address the general concern that the sample was altered in some systematic way during the adsorption analysis. Moreover, we argue that s-calibration would not have sufficiently addressed either of the substantive concerns.
In order to rule out the possibility of chemical interaction between the sample and the adsorbent column, Tswett (1907, 141-142) carried out three experiments. In his first experiment, Tswett conducted two simultaneous adsorption analyses using different adsorbent columns. He seems to have assumed that if the sample had chemically interacted with one or both of the adsorbents, then the pattern in subsequent spectral 9 Preliminary experiments with various solvents, adsorbates, and adsorbents are discussed in the 1903 paper and the experiments on chlorophyll specifically are presented in Tswett (1907b) . 10 See Willstätter (1913, 147-149) for a short summary of an allomerization process that concerned him and Willstätter (1913, (237) (238) (239) (240) (241) (242) for his concern about oxidation. 11 Hence, we think that Livengood (2009, 66) is wrong when he says that Tswett's "only living doubt" was also expressed by Willstätter. Granted, Tswett's doubt and Willstätter's doubt are instances of a more general worry about chemical alteration of the sample during adsorption. However, the two specific concerns are not identical.
analyses would be different. However, the results of the spectral analyses were identical.
He writes (1907b, 141):
Although the adsorption on CaCO3 makes the assumption of a chemical modification of the chlorophyll dyes very unlikely, and the spectra just identified are to be considered as ordinary dyes, I considered it necessary, for these results, to control these methods as far as possible by other methods. First, CaCO3 was replaced by sucrose in the capillary water-tube, on the surface of which are OHions. The results remained the same. I further prepared chromatograms of chlorophyll on CaCO3 and extracted them without decomposing them in alcoholic petroleum ether (with the addition of filtered carotene). The solution showed the same absorption spectrum as the initial adsorption used. In other experiments, the spectrum of the original solution was prepared by mixing the isolated, spectrally-analyzed dyes. Finally, chlorophyllin α, even without adsorption, was presented in small quantities: with emery and CaCO3, crushed Taxus leaves were thoroughly extracted with pure petroleum ether to remove the carotene as much as possible. The pulp was then extracted by means of alcoholic petroleum ether and shaken with 80% alcohol to remove the xanthophylls and the chlorophyllin β, the latter being more soluble in said alcohol than chlorophyllin α. Then the petroleum ether solution was shaken with stronger (90%) alcohol, which absorbs most of the chlorophyllin, while the petroleum ether solution mainly retained the last traces of carotene. The chlorophyllin, dissolved in petroleum ether, then showed the already known spectrum, especially the weak bands IV and V, in the same position and intensity.
Tswett does not say explicitly, but he seems to have assumed that if two samples produce the same absorption bands, then they are very likely to be samples of the same substance.
If so, his second and third experiments provided strong evidence that his samples were not being altered by chemical interaction with the adsorbent columns. Tswett's experiments also provided strong evidence that the sample was not being altered in any other way. If the sample were altered by oxidation as Willstätter suggested, then the absorption bands in the initial spectral analysis would be different from the absorption bands in the final spectral analysis. Since the entire adsorption process is bracketed by the spectral analyses, any alteration is detectable. The specific source of the alteration makes no difference to the power of the experiment to detect it.
At the beginning of this section, we said that Tswett faced two substantive concerns and one methodological objection. We have explained how Tswett's experiments answered the substantive concerns that the sample might be altered in some way during the adsorption process and why s-calibration would not have answered those concerns. In the next section, we turn to the methodological objection. Marchlewski (1907b, 226-227) complained that endorsing the results from CAA would require independent evidence that the results from the entrenched techniques were incorrect.
But Mr. TSWETT not only sins in methodological terms, he uses apodictic statements that have no value in science. Our results must be wrong, simply because they disagree with his! Mr. TSWETT would first have to prove why the criteria we use are insufficient to assess the purity of the chlorophyll we are describing, and as long as he does not do so on the basis of exact experiments, I must leave any further remarks in relationship to Mr. TSWETT unanswered.
Without independent evidence, relying solely on CAA to establish the reliability of CAA-as Marchlewski alleged that Tswett had done-would be viciously circular.
The difficulty that Marchlewski raised has a similar underlying logic to what Collins (1985) calls the Experimenters' Regress (see especially 83-89 and 100-103).
Radder (1992, 67) Zuppone (2017) argues that as a general rule, the regress form is subordinate to the vicious circle form (which she calls "general reciprocity"). 14 We think the vicious circle form of the Experimenters' Regress is essentially a version of a very general puzzle in epistemology that Chisholm (1982) calls the problem of the criterion. He writes (62), "To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedures [sic] is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle." unavailable to Tswett. The fact that no theory of the instrument was available to Tswett made Marchlewski's objection-essentially the vicious circle form of the Experimenters'
Regress-pressing. It also makes what Tswett ultimately did that much more impressive.
As we've seen, Marchlewski demanded that Tswett provide independent reason to think that the results of the entrenched techniques were incorrect because he thought that CAA could not undermine the entrenched results on its own without vicious circularity.
The justificatory picture that Marchlewski assumed looks like this:
The arrows in the diagram represent a justification relation. The reliability of the instrument (in this case, CAA) justifies the reliability of the data, and the reliability of the data justifies the reliability of the instrument. Put more simply, a good instrument produces good data, and good data are produced by a good instrument. Hence, Marchlewski's challenge shares its logical structure with the vicious circle form of the Experimenters' Regress.
In discussing the Experimenters' Regress, Collins supposes both that the only rational justification for claiming that an instrument is good is that it produces good data and also that the only rational justification for saying that some data are good is that they are produced by a good instrument. But this is an impoverished view of experimentation.
Scientists typically have access to more than just the data and the instruments that produce the data. At the very least, the picture has to be complicated as follows:
In this picture, "theories" may be understood either widely or narrowly. Understood narrowly, a theory is an explicit account of the behavior of an instrument that typically warrants belief in the reliability of the instrument. Such a theory may be called a theory of the instrument. For example, optical theory provides an account of the behavior of the microscope and warrants belief in its reliability. Understood widely, theories include broad assumptions about the objects of study, experimental design, or instrumentation more generally. A theory in the wide sense may even include epistemic and metaphysical assumptions about the scientific method, laws of nature, causation, and so on.
There are cases where no narrow theory exists-that is, cases where there is no explicit theory of the instrument. In such cases it is tempting to think that a genuine datainstrument circle must arise and that the Experimenters' Regress is a serious problem.
Chromatography appears to be just such a case. Adsorption was not well understood during Tswett's lifetime. Tswett appealed to theoretical work by Gibbs in order to justify the claim that the parts separated by adsorption analysis were optically and chemically distinct. However, Gibbs' theoretical work was not well-suited to answering
Marchlewski's challenge given what was known about adsorption at the time.
In an important paper "On the Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Systems," Gibbs Second, a theory of adsorption is not equivalent to a theory of chromatography.
Explicit theories of chromatography were not developed until significantly after the technique was rediscovered and applied by Lederer, Kuhn, and others in the 1930s.
Having a theory of chromatography requires (at least) having a theory of solute retention and a theory of solute dispersion. According to Cazes and Scott (2002, p.4 
Section 3: Breaking the Regress: A Material Approach
In the absence of an explicit theory adequate to assure skeptics that the chlorophyll sample was unaltered by Tswett's technique, we think that it appeared to Marchlewski that CAA fell into a genuine data-instrument circle. But Marchlewski was mistaken.
There were material facts outside the data-instrument circle available to Tswett. He could have appealed and we think did appeal to facts about spectroscopic analysis and chemical interaction in order to justify his claims about chlorophyll. In this section, we reconstruct the reasoning Tswett employed in more detail. We think our reconstruction is historically plausible, and we intend for it to be understood as a conjecture about how Tswett and
Marchlewski reasoned about CAA and chlorophyll chemistry. However, neither Tswett nor Marchlewski is as explicit about his reasoning as we would like, and as far as we know, there are no surviving laboratory notes or letters that might give us insight beyond the published record. Our reconstruction is informed by the whole pattern of argumentation in Tswett (1903 Tswett ( , 1906a Tswett ( , 1906b Tswett ( , 1906c Tswett ( , 1906d Tswett ( , 1907a Tswett ( , 1907b Tswett ( , 1907c Tswett ( , 1907d Tswett ( , 1907e, 1908a Tswett ( , 1908b Tswett ( , 1908c Tswett ( , 1908d Tswett ( , 1908e, 1908f, 1908g, 1910 Tswett ( , 1911a Tswett ( , 1911b Tswett ( , and 1911c , Marchlewski (1902 Marchlewski ( , 1906a Marchlewski ( , 1906b Marchlewski ( , 1907a Marchlewski ( , 1907b Marchlewski ( , 1907c Marchlewski ( , 1908a Marchlewski ( , 1908b Marchlewski ( , 1908c Marchlewski ( , 1908d Marchlewski ( , 1911 , and Marchlewski (1912a and 1912b ). But we have found it difficult to isolate short passages that clearly support each step that we take. We encourage curious and skeptical readers to look closely at Tswett and Marchlewski's papers, to raise specific challenges to our reconstruction, and to frame a plausible alternative.
In reconstructing Tswett's reasoning, we have been inspired by Norton's material theory of induction (see Norton 2003 Norton , 2011 Norton , 2014 , according to which there is no universally-applicable, purely formal rule of inductive inference and no global fact (such as the "fact" that nature is uniform) that warrants every inductive inference.
Rather, each inductive inference is powered by a local matter of fact. We find that paying attention to local matters of fact throws substantial light on the debate between Tswett and Marchlewski. As we have already said, we intend our reconstruction to be read as a conjecture about what actually happened in a specific moment in the history of science.
However, at least some interesting theoretical claims may be made on the basis of our account understood as a merely possible, rational reconstruction of the case. For example, we want to say that actual working scientists sometimes appeal to local matters of fact in order to break the Experimenters' Regress. To support that claim, we need a plausible account of what actually happened. But in order to support the weaker modal claim that scientists could break the Regress by appealing to local matters of fact (without a robust theory of an instrument and without conducting any s-calibration experiments), our account merely needs to possible.
We take Tswett's central argument to be for the claim that all raw chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the fixed proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}. 17 The argument proceeds from the character of a sample of chlorophyll as follows:
[A1] (tacit, background assumption) Samples of chlorophyll are exchangeable with respect to how many parts the sample has and the proportions in which those parts occur; that is, what is true of one sample is true of every sample.
[A2] This sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}. =================== (therefore inductively)
[A3] Every sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}.
[A1] is either a generalization for inductive inference or a universal claim in a deductive runs as follows:
[B1] CAA separates this sample of chlorophyll into the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} having proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}.
[B2] If so, then this sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}.
17 Most of the exchange between Tswett and Marchlewski deals with chlorophyll in the strict sense, meaning Tswett's chlorophyll-α and chlorophyll-β. Tswett (1908c Tswett ( , 1352 claimed that the two chlorophylls occur in ether solution in the ratio 5:1. Citing that paper, Jacobson and Marchlewsi (1912, 221) say that Tswett maintained the view "that the two are always present in the ratio of 1:5." Of course, Tswett recognized that the raw chlorophyll included xanthophylls and carotenes as well. So, the claim we are attributing to Tswett is an abstracted schema that we think he would have endorsed. 18 See also, Tswett (1906c, 322 ).
------------[A2]
This sample of chlorophyll has the parts {C1, C2, …, CN} in the proportions {P1, P2, …, PN}.
We present the sub-argument for [A2] as deductive, but one might construe it as a broadly inductive argument by weakening or qualifying the premisses as needed.
Marchlewski's version of the Experimenters' Regress challenged [B2] by
emphasizing that Tswett did not know whether the sample was chemically altered during the adsorption process. We take the objection to have this form:
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[M1] If we don't know whether the sample was chemically altered during the process of CAA, then we should not endorse [B2].
[M2] We don't know whether the sample was chemically altered during the process of CAA.
The claim that the sample was being altered during the adsorption process was a reasonable provisional hypothesis explaining the difference in results between the entrenched techniques and Tswett's new technique. A cautious approach would tend to favor the entrenched techniques and Marchlewski's explanation. 19 The are several ways one might characterize this argument. First, we may alter the target of Marchlewski's objection. On our view the target isn't CAA itself, but about whether Tswett is warranted to accept [B2] given what he knows about CAA. There may be reasons to prefer an objection that attacks B2 directly, although this appears more faithful to the objection Marchlewski actually leveled against Tswett. Second, we may alter the strength of the objection. On the one hand, we might interpret the objection as about the mere possibility of the sample's being altered. This interpretation would replace premise [M1] with, "If it is possible that the sample was chemically altered…" Such an objection seems far too demanding if one has in mind metaphysical or even physical possibility. On the other hand, we might interpret the objection as about only some "live hypotheses" relevant to alteration of the sample. In this case [M1] would focus on whether we've eliminated relevant alternative explanations for the results. This seems more plausible but is weaker than our reconstruction above. [D1] CAA of chlorophyll using chalk as an adsorbent yields the same spectroscopic results as CAA of chlorophyll using sugar as an adsorbent.
[D2] If so, then CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation.
CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation.
20 See especially Tswett (1906c, 319) and Tswett (1906d, 386 (1906b, 386) for interactions between chlorophyll and absorbents. And see especially, Tswett (1907b, 141) , where he describes his calibration experiments.
Tswett's first experiment and the corresponding argument above are not entirely adequate. The argument effectively assuages the worry that the chlorophyll chemically interacts with the adsorbent, but it doesn't rule out the possibility that the chlorophyll is altered in some other way, e.g. by interacting with atmospheric oxygen while adsorbed, as Willstätter worried. Tswett's second and third experiments are more successful. We lay out the argument as follows:
[E1] A spectroscopic analysis conducted before CAA and a spectroscopic analysis conducted after CAA yield identical results.
[E2] If so, then CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation. [F1] CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of a known test sample during separation.
[F2] If so, then CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation.
------------[C2] CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation.
The problem, though, is that for [F2] to be plausible, the test sample needs to be (relevantly) chemically similar to the target raw chlorophyll sample. If the test sample is chemically very different from raw chlorophyll, then the inference is precarious. In the case of a sample of essentially unknown character, the fact needed to secure [F2] is simply unavailable.
An anonymous referee wondered whether Tswett could have appealed to some other facts in order to make use of s-calibration to argue for [C2] . If so, then our claim that s-calibration could not have used s-calibration to show that CAA worked with respect to chlorophyll. We think this is unlikely. Consider the following plausiblelooking approach. Although very little was known about raw chlorophyll, Tswett's contemporaries did know that raw chlorophyll is a mixture of very unstable organic pigments and that the entire mixture is insoluble in water but soluble in ether. Perhaps
Tswett could have used another mixture of organic pigments as a surrogate and argued as follows:
[G1] CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of this mixture of organic pigments during separation.
[G2] If so, then CAA doesn't chemically alter the parts of chlorophyll during separation.
However, in order to confirm [G1], Tswett would have needed to know the chemical character of at least one organic pigment (or better, pigment mixture) that could have been assumed to be not-too-different in relevant respects from the parts of chlorophyll.
Some organic pigments were well-understood by the early 1900s. For example, Baeyer had described the structure of alizarin and indigo in the 1860s and 1870s.
23 However, the pigments with known structures were comparatively simple, much more stable, and unlike chlorophyll in some chemically important ways, such as being soluble in water but not in ether. Better surrogate organic pigments, such as carotin, hemoglobin, and lutein
were not well-understood at the time. Carotin was investigated using CAA in the late 1910s by the American chemist Leory Palmer. 24 Hemoglobin, which has an extremely similar chemical structure to chlorophyll α, was being studied at around the same time as Nagendrappa (2014) . 24 See Ettre and Zlatkis (1979) for discussion of some (re)discoveries of chromatography after Tswett, and see Ettre and Wixom (1993c) for discussion of Palmer specifically. 25 See Skarzynski (1946) . 26 See Orna (2013, 124-125 In this section we've suggested that Tswett had some material facts available to him that were powerful enough to justify his technique. Furthermore, the calibration experiments Tswett performed were sufficient to answer the objections Marchlewski raised and to break the Experimenter's Regress. However, these experiments do not meet the orthodox definition of calibration in Collins (1985) , Franklin (1994 Franklin ( , 1997 , etc. In the next section we address calibration directly.
Section 4: Calibration
The orthodox view among philosophers, at least until recently, appears to be that calibration just is s-calibration. With some recent exceptions that we will discuss later in this section, every account of calibration we know of says that a calibration experiment for an instrument or method uses some input of known character to show that the instrument or method gives the correct output for some of the inputs in its scope. These experiments then support the claim that the instrument or method will likewise give the correct output for a novel input. Collins (1985, 105) writes: "Calibration is the use of a surrogate signal to standardize an instrument. The use of calibration depends on the assumption of near identity of effect between the surrogate signal and the unknown signal that is to be measured (detected) with the instrument." Franklin (1994) Franklin (1997, 31) writes:
Calibration, the use of a surrogate signal to standardize an instrument, is an important strategy for the establishment of the validity of experimental results. If an apparatus reproduces known phenomena, then we legitimately strengthen our belief that the apparatus is working properly and that the experimental results produced with that apparatus are reliable.
Writing about the (alleged) use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy, Cummins (1998, (116) (117) gives a similar account:
Every scientific subdiscipline spends a good deal of effort identifying and correcting errors and artifacts. What is important for present purposes is that an observational technique is deemed acceptable just to the extent that it can be relied upon to produce accurate representations or indicators of its targets. This is why observational procedures in general, and instruments in particular, have to be calibrated. When Galileo pointed his newly devised telescope at the moon and saw mountains-earthlike blemishes on what should have been a perfect celestial object-it was legitimate for the opposition to inquire whether the apparent mountains were artifacts. The proper response was to point the telescope at something of known size, shape, distance, color, and so on to determine what distortions it introduced; to calibrate it, in short.
And the orthodox view that calibration just is s-calibration seems to be the standard view among working scientists, as well. [H3] Tswett's experiments did not involve a surrogate signal. [J2] Tswett could have calibrated CAA with respect to chlorophyll.
If calibration just is s-calibration, then calibration of CAA with respect to chlorophyll could not have fulfilled any of its epistemic functions.
We think that it should always be possible to calibrate an instrument or technique in a way that fulfills the epistemic functions of calibration. But if so, then calibration is not just s-calibration.
A third argument motivated by our first two proceeds as follows. We have appealed to a categorization judgment in our first argument, but we expect that judgment to be controversial. Hence, we are motivated to find a more widely-acceptable way to constrain theories of calibration. Inspired by our second argument, we think that a plausible way to constrain theorizing about calibration is to focus on its epistemic functions. If one accepts that a good account of calibration should make sense of its epistemic functions, then one will be inclined to accept a broader account of calibration to the degree that a broader account does a better job making sense of the epistemic features of calibration.
At this point we want to highlight the ends that calibration serves according to Collins, Franklin, and For those who want "calibrate" to be a success term, drop "design" from our account and make adjustments as necessary. 30 The VIM the French translation of "calibration" is "étalonnage" meaning more directly something like the act of étalon-ing or "standardizing."
Perovic's account from ours is the phrase "already-known phenomena," which we take to require a comparison between the deliverances of an instrument to be calibrated and something independently known about the target of application for the instrument. For example, one might point a telescope at an object whose basic properties are already known by way of direct perception, as we saw Cummins suggest earlier, or one might point a microscope at a disc whose markings are already known because they are manufactured, as Hacking (1983, 203) In practices dedicated to the invention of new instrumental devices, as in any other type of scientific practices, calibration minimally refers, at the most general level, to the achievement of a reliable instrument-token (typically a measurer) regarding some mesuranda.
Soler's account here is very close to ours. But there is a difference that turns on how one understands the phrase "reliable instrument-token." Since Soler is talking about reliability regarding some mesuranda, we understand an instrument-token to be reliable if it is highly likely that the instrument accurately represents the thing being measured. 31 On our view, calibration establishes that an instrument does what it is supposed to do. We often want our instruments to deliver sufficiently accurate measurements with high probability.
Consequently, in those cases our account says the same thing as Soler's. However, an instrument might do exactly what it's supposed to do without delivering accurate measurements with high probability. Let's illustrate the difference with some examples.
Consider a device that is supposed to produce a random integer in the range from 1 to 100. An experimenter uses this instrument when randomly sampling from a target population. And an experimenter might get evidence confirming or disconfirming the claim that for any number in the range, the probability that the device outputs that number is 1/100 (or at least close to it). To calibrate the device is not to show that it is accurately measuring anything. The numbers delivered by the instrument are not 31 Later in Soler's essay she discusses cases in which a new instrument is being actively developed. She refers to these as NewLI practices (for New Local Instruments). However, in such cases she says that calibration is a demonstration that "the instrumental outputs of the new instrument cohere with what is already taken for granted in the present stage of scientific development" (emphasis in original). As we've discussed above coherence with alternative separation techniques was unavailable to Tswett and would have only been another instance of s-calibration.
measurements. But the experimenter still wants to know that the device is doing what it is supposed to do. We might say that the experimenter wants to know that the instrument reliably produces a random number. But in saying this, we should not be understood as saying that the experimenter wants to know that with high probability, the device accurately represents something that is being measured. Rather, we should be understood as saying that with high probability the instrument does what it is supposed to do, i.e.
generate a number in the range from 1 to 100 such that for any number in that range, the probability of that number being generated is 1/100.
The randomizer is a special case of a larger category of instruments that we might call producers or generators, which are calibrated by establishing that they generate what they are supposed to generate. For example, calibrating a laser might involve establishing that it outputs coherent light at a specific (intended) wavelength. Or suppose that an experimenter designs a device to "knock" a system out of equilibrium at regular intervals by impressing a specific (intended) force to an object in the system. As with the randomizer, we aren't trying to establish that these devices are accurately measuring anything. The experimenter need not use these devices to measure anything in order to be interested in knowing that the instrument generates the output it is supposed to generate. 
